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Weis: The Federal Courts Study Committee Begins Its Work.

THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
BEGINS ITS WORK
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. WEIS, JR.*

Bringing federal court modernization before this group brings to
mind Yogi Berra's classic comment, "It's d6jA vu all over again." But
court reform generally moves at a snail's pace-persistence and repetition are seemingly inevitable in the process.
The idea of a federal courts study committee is not a novel one. In
the last 10 years, the concept has been the subject of various bills in
Congress and has been discussed regularly at these conferences. At
the close of the session in the autumn of 1988, Congress finally created the Federal Courts Study Committee. This committee differs in
some respects from the earlier proposals for a commission. Thus, any
discussion of the new committee should begin with the language of
the enacting statute.
The committee is established within the judicial conference-not as
an independent body. However, in addition to trial and appellate
judges, its membership includes practitioners of the bar and members
of Congress. Recognized experts in the field, Senators Howell Heflin
(D-Ala.) and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Representatives Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) and Carlos
Moorehead (R-Cal.) of the House Judiciary Committee are active
members of the group.
As stated in the statute,' the committee's purposes are to:
1. Examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the
United States;
2. Develop a long-range plan for the future of the federal judiciary,
including assessments involving(A) Alternate methods of dispute resolution;
(B) The structure and administration of the federal court system;
*
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on the Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institute on Saturday, April
1989.
1. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 102, 102 STAT. 4644 (1988)(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331).
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(C) Methods of resolving intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts in the
courts of appeals; and
(D) The types of disputes resolved by federal courts.
The committee is instructed to "make a complete study of the
courts of the United States and of the several states" and to submit a
report by April 1, 1990 to the President, the Chief Justice, the Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of
Chief Justices, and the State Justice Institute.2 The report is to recommend revisions to the laws of the United States, to develop a longrange plan for the judicial system, and to make such other recommendations and conclusions as the committee deems advisable.'
Unlike former study groups which concentrated on the courts of
appeals or the Supreme Court, this committee is to focus its attention
on a broad plan for the federal judiciary as a whole, emphasizing the
specific areas noted above.
Obviously, developing a long-range plan requires a study of what
the courts are doing at the present time. Also necessary is some serious thought on the role of the courts, and what that role should be.
These roles are not necessarily the same.
Because the committee must consider issues confronting the courts,
our first three months were devoted to identifying the problems to be
addressed. Work began with a broad solicitation of views on the issues by:
1. Surveying all members of the federal judiciary;
2. Inviting suggestions from an extensive range of organizations including citizen groups, bar organizations, research groups, academics,
civil rights interests and others;
3. Contacting all federal court administrators, chief probation officers,
pre-trial services chiefs, and federal public defenders.
In addition, we sought and received a number of suggestions from
both the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the
Federal Judicial Center. We also invited comments from all law
school deans.
The committee held four public hearings in various cities across the
nation, receiving testimony from seventy-five quite diverse witnesses.

2. Id. § 105(1).

3. Id. § 105(2)-(4).
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The committee has also received a fairly steady stream of public comment in the media.
Several organizations are preparing issue focus studies for us. For
example, the Carnegie Foundation will present a paper on science and
technology issues affecting the courts. The Center for Public Service
Resources in New York is preparing a presentation on alternative dispute resolution issues.
We are engaged in dialogues with the State Justice Institute and the
American Judicature Society, and will be accepting offers of assistance from the National Institute of Justice, the National Center for
State Courts, the Conference of State Chief Justices, and others. We
will coordinate our efforts with a number of other programs such as
the Senate Judiciary Committee's Civil Litigation Project.
The full committee has divided its work internally by forming three
subcommittees, assisted by a number of able reporters from academia,
experts from the Federal Judicial Center and staff members from congressional committees. A small but dedicated and hard-working central staff has exerted untiring effort on behalf of the committee.
Because, to this point, the committee has been engaged almost exclusively in defining the issues for study, it has not taken any position
on the policies it will recommend or even what subjects it can address
in the limited time available. The comments that follow in these brief
remarks, therefore, express some of my own, very tentative views and
do not necessarily reflect those of the committee.
In the early 1950s, Justice Frankfurter expressed his concern over
the detrimental effect of increasing the size of the federal judiciary,
but little heed was paid to his warnings. In the 1970s, Judge Friendly
and others spoke of an inevitable loss of quality in product and confidence in the federal courts if growth continued unabated. But again,
few listened.
The Freund Commission, a Department of Justice study, and the
Hruska Commission proposed changes primarily to assist the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. Opposition by both bench
and bar succeeded in turning away some of the major proposals.
But growth continued and, indeed, accelerated. The gloomy predictions of the past have proved to prophetic: the federal courts have
already exceeded the size many thought to be desirable. The future
looks no brighter.
The Administrative Office of the Federal Courts recent projection is
that by the year 2000 (only 11 years from now), filings in the courts of
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appeals will increase 76% over the number of appeals in 1988. Let
me amplify that statistic. In 1972 there were 14,534 filings in the
courts of appeals; in the year 2000, only 28 years later, it is predicted
that appeals will number 66,000-an increase of more than 400%. In
the year 2000, filings in the district courts will soar 63% from the
1988 levels, and the bankruptcy filings will swell by 152%.
Assuming that a continuing increase at this rate is unacceptable, it
is obvious that we have a problem. Essentially, what has happened in
the 100 years, and particularly in the last 30, is that the pendulum has
swung in the direction of increasing the burden on the federal courts.
Although the first judiciary act may have given too little jurisdiction
to the federal courts, they now have too much to do.
Long-range planning for the federal courts must accept the premise
that litigation growth will parallel the rise in population. Legal disputes must be adjudicated in one of two forums-the federal or the
state courts. The division of litigation between those two systems will
have a direct bearing on the size of the federal courts and most certainly an impact on their mission. In the past, increases in case load
were met by adding additional judges. This, however, is not the optimal solution for our overload in the long range.
There may be some room for increased efficiency in the methods
courts use to process their work, and here we can assess the potential
for alternative dispute resolution. But frankly, I think the gains in
this area will be limited.
I doubt very much that any change in appellate procedures could
allow the courts of appeals to absorb a 70% increase in filings without
restructuring or adding a substantial number of new judges.
Automation can speed the transmission of needed information to
the judge's desk and eliminate some slippage in the processing of appeals. However, the critical element-reasoned deliberation by the
judge-is the factor that will be impaired by further increases in volume. Attacking large numbers of cases by increasing staff cannot help
but move decision-making away from the intense personal scrutiny of
the judge to the unacceptable alternate of hurried judicial approval of
staff submissions.
In addition to a long-range plan, the committee has other assignments related to that central objective. Among these are the nagging
problems of intercircuit and intracircuit conflicts of decisions in the
courts of appeals. Again, the problem is not new-it has been raised
in the past. Various solutions, including the creation of a new inter-
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mediate court between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court,
or an intercircuit tribunal, have been proposed.
Perhaps there has not been sufficiently vigorous opposition to the
tacit acceptance of the notion that intercircuit conflicts are inevitable.
Essentially, avoidable intercircuit conflicts occur because the courts of
appeals are considered to be semi-autonomous, regional courts. That
formulation for an intermediate appellate structure, however, should
be reevaluated.
When the circuit courts of appeals were first established in 1891,
they were adjuncts to the trial court, then known as the "circuit
court." The judges on those circuit courts of appeals acted in both
trial and appellate capacities. As time went on, the dual function
proved impracticable, and in 1912 the circuit courts-the trial
courts-were abolished, leaving the appellate entities to survive along
with the district courts.
The primary mission of the courts of appeals originally was to correct errors which occurred during trials, reserving the function of assuring consistency in decisional law to supervision by the Supreme
Court. As the volume of litigation grew over the years, the Supreme
Court no longer was able to adequately meet the supervisory and lawgiving function. Consequently, much of the decisional law formulation-particularly in the field of statutory interpretation-was assumed by the courts of appeals, by default as it were.
The concept of regional, semi-independent forums exercising an error-correction function was workable originally. But as time went on,
few observers seemed to sense the anomaly of intermediate courts of
appeals adopting independent and conflicting views on national law.
Courts often flatly disagreed with earlier pronouncements on statutory interpretation made by the courts of appeals in other circuits.
The practice seemed to spread gradually, not provoking any violent
objection. And with time came acquiescence. Today, one court of
appeals feels free to disagree with any other if convinced that the earlier decision was not correct. Thus, we have the curious system where
regional courts, sitting in different sections of the country, apply the
same federal statute in a different manner. What results is a balkanization of federal law instead of uniformity.
Strangely enough, many judges and academic commentators accept
the situation, defending it as a "percolation" process which ultimately
results in the "correct" decision. This approach fails to question the
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validity of a system which, although intended to apply federal statutes
uniformly, does not do so.
I do not speak of inadvertent conflicts, but of deliberate and reasoned rejections of conformity. Indeed, governmental agencies openly
seek to create conflicts between the courts of appeals in order to invite
a final resolution by the Supreme Court. This practice not only
squanders scarce judicial resources in an era when we should be conserving them, but invites disrespect for the administration of justice
and heaps unnecessary work on an already overburdened Supreme
Court.
Because of the heavy volume of cases coming to the courts of appeals and the large number of judges who now sit on those courts, it is
impossible to secure complete uniformity. Inadvertent conflicts will
occur. However, a structure which permits and even encourages deliberate intercircuit conflicts requires basic rethinking.
There may be a number of solutions, such as creating another separate court, but perhaps something more fundamental is necessary.
For example, could not each of the regional courts of appeals in the
thirteen circuits be considered a division of one, unified federal court
of appeals. Divisions could function much as the courts in the circuits
do today, perhaps in the same geographic areas. As an alternative,
the divisions could be limited in size so that no court would have
more than nine judges, thus preserving the benefits of collegiality.
However, the decision in one division would have national effect
and would not be confined to that division or circuit as is true today.
Inadvertent conflicts and difference in emphasis in decisions which
can have an unsettling effect could be handled through an intra-court
procedure which might take a number of forms.
Treating the courts of appeals as one unit offers other advantages
and gives greater flexibility to meet changing conditions. The benefits
of smaller, collegial groups could be retained-and perhaps expanded-by the use of a divisional organization. Current practices
could continue so that judges would be appointed to, and function in,
a specific division, rather than being assigned at large to a massive,
impersonal, national body.
Details, of course, need to be hammered out, but the concept is, I
believe, essentially workable and holds out the promise of solving
many of the problems that confront the appellate courts today.
Another idea brought to our attention is the need for greater and
more efficient exchange of information between the courts and Con-
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gress on questions raised by statutory interpretation. Ambiguities and
gaps in legislative drafting which have come to the notice of the
courts could be called to the attention of Congress through some regular process. Congress could then correct the deficiency legislatively
and end uncertainties about the statute.
Reallocation of functions between the district courts and courts of
appeals in review of administrative decisions also merits further
discussion.
I have done no more in this limited time than survey a few of the
many issues that have been brought to the committee's attention. It is
unrealistic to expect that we can develop and recommend all of them
in the limited time available to us. Nevertheless, we have been stimulated, not discouraged, by the enormity of our assignment and are
pressing ahead to prepare our report.
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